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Abstract:
The possibility of a very protracted existence of civilizations is
examined and in the case of the largest ones (European, Middle Eastern,
East Asian, South Asian, Sub-Saharan African, Central Asian) it is
found to be probable. The long-term evolutionary stages of these civilizations are identified, in the case of the European civilization the usual
historical periodization (Neolithic, Antiquity, Middle Age, Modern Age)
is acceptable, but in the case of the others a different periodization
(Neolithic, Antiquity, Age of Expansion) seems to be more satisfactory.
A "halving rule of the ages" is found (the duration of an age is half of
the duration of the previous one). The theory of the "periodical
(European) world wars" is examined and recent results are surveyed.
The large conflict zones (shatterbelts) are surveyed and the hypothesis of the "periodical crisis sequences" is examined.
1. Introduction
Traditional historiography usually amasses long descriptions of
numerous events. Historians typically add some explanations to their
descriptions (stating that some events were more important than others,
such as establishing causal relationships) but these explanations tend to
be too specific. There has long been a demand for a more "systematic"
historiography. Among numerous experiments, probably the most significant is the description of breaking down history into "civilizations."
This method appeared in the 19 century (e.g. in the works of N.
Danilevsky), but the most significant books based on this idea were
published in the first half of the 20 century. Probably the best known
example is the work of A. Toynbee [1], A typical problem with this
"civilizationist" description is the assumption that civilizations are
"born," "mature," and "die," like human beings and that this life cycle is
finite and sometimes brief. This assumption collides with a very common feature of the traditional descriptions of national histories, which
frequently claim that the "core" of the nation exists continuously since
lh
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prehistoric times (one could mention here many examples from Ireland
to Japan). In spite of the many successes of the 19 and 20'" century
archaeology it is very difficult to determine the truth about prehistory,
but it seems probable that such statements are not altogether unfounded (at least if we interpret the notion of "core" not as a "sovereign state"
but as a culturally identifiable ethnic group).
Recently D. Wilkinson created a civilizational theory that describes
civilizations as continuous entities from prehistoric to modern times [2].
Unfortunately, his theory has another difficulty: he assumes that political and military contacts between civilizations inevitably cause the
"merging" of the contacting civilizations, i.e, there now exists only one
"Central Civilization." This is again a problematic assumption: the religious, political and other differences between and among the different
countries (or regions) are probably not lesser today than a hundred (or
a thousand) years ago, and even the widespread acquisition of modern
weapons does not imply that every army has the same "military culture."
To avoid these problems one should identify (at least) the "major
civilizations" that can be traced back to prehistoric times.
"Civilizations" are usually defined as "cultures with complex social
structures (states with significantly specialised labour-division
schemes)." Major civilizations can be defined as those civilizations that
produced "great powers" (in the usual politico-military sense) during
their histories. But in prehistoric times, "civilizations" (with the implication of cities) did not exist, therefore we should examine the "cultures."
Interpreting the notion of culture as the archaeologists do (eg. "a
recurring assemblage of artifacts assumed to be representative of a particular set of activities carried out by a particular group of humans at a
particular time") would lead to a hopeless confusion, there are thousands of archaeologically identified cultures. But a common definition
of "culture" (which doesn't contradict the archaeological definition) can
be the following: "culture is what a human group has in common but
differing from other groups." In this case we can say that the major cultures coincide with the major human races because biological features
are the most basic "commonality" that people may have. In order to
avoid misunderstandings the followings should be noted:
The author doesn't think that certain races are more valuable
than others.
lh
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The author doesn't think that "culture" is biologically determined. But culture is the result of common efforts: we learn it
from each other, we practice it (usually) by acting together.
Any common efforts are strongly facilitated by the feeling that
we belong to the same group and common biological features
are obvious sources of such a feeling.
The major human races (i.e., those which occupy large territories
and have large populations continuously from ancient to modern times)
are the following: African, East Asian, European, Middle Eastern, and
South Asian.
Anthropologists usually consider the "European" and the "Middle
Eastern" as a single race, but because of the very significant cultural differences here we must separate them. This classification is a good start:
all of the mentioned groups have produced "great powers" during their
histories. But if it is compared to the lists of civilizations produced by
the "classical" civilizationists, then this definition seems to be rather
crude. To refine it (to identify more closely the social groups which produce "great powers") one must examine each racial group separately.
2. Listing the (sub)civilizations
It is better to begin with European civilization because European
history is probably the best documented (and certainly the most analyzed in detail) case of historiography. European civilization is a highly
mobile phenomenon: the distance between the oldest ("Ancient Greece"
which can be either Mycenae or Crete, see later) and newest (21 century USA) great powers is more than 8000 kms. Therefore the European
subcivilizations are usually differentiated on the basis of religion:
Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant. This grouping covers only the Modern
Age (in the strict sense there were no Protestants before Luther published his theses) but if one draws the division lines between these
groups on the map of Europe then it is visible that this religious division
has a geographic meaning, too: South-western and Central Europe is
Catholic, South-eastern and Eastern Europe is Orthodox, Northern and
North-western Europe is Protestant.
These geographic divisions can be extended to the areas conquered (and populated) by Europeans in the Modern Age. Latin
America can be considered as extension of South-western Europe,
North America as the extension of North-western Europe, Siberia as the
extension of Eastern Europe. What is more important, these divisions
can be extended in time, too. The border between the Eastern and
s1
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Western Roman Empire was officially drawn only in 395, but significant cultural differences existed between the Eastern and Western
Mediterranean regions many hundred years earlier.
The peoples of Northern Europe were also prominent in antiquity; Celts and Germans many times played an important role in the history of that age. In their best days they certainly can be considered as
"strong regional powers," but what is even more important, they were
able to maintain their independence in spite of the Roman colonisation
efforts. In the Early Middle Age these threefold divisions are not very
obvious, but if one looks at the map of Europe in 800 CE (in [3]) then
it is visible that the "large" cities (over 15,000 inhabitants) in the territories ruled by Europeans form three major groups: North-western
Europe (in the Paris-Cologne region), Italy (Milan, Rome etc.) and the
Byzantine Empire (from Cherson to Syracuse, with Constantinople as
the largest city of Europe). This indicates that the major urban cultures
followed this threefold geographic division even in that troublesome
age of European history. Other major civilizations were much less
mobile, therefore similar geographic divisions are less problematic.
In the Middle East, great powers usually emerge in the following
regions: Egypt, Mesopotamia, Iran, Anatolia (these names here must be
interpreted as strictly geographical terms, such terms as "northern Nile
valley" or "Iranian plateau" would be more precise but rather awkward).
These areas also show remarkable ethnic continuity (except Anatolia).
Roughly the same ethnic groups inhabit them since early antiquity,
therefore we can hope that their histories will show some repetitive patterns.
In East Asia, the significant geographic regions are: China, Japan,
Central Asia (the Mongolia-Kazakhstan region), and South-east Asia
(the Burma-Java-Philippines triangle). The latter is an ethnically (and
historically) quite diverse region, probably should be divided into
smaller parts, but really great powers never emerged in that region, only
regional powers. Therefore from our viewpoint, finer divisions are not
necessary.
The nomad culture of the Central Asian peoples differs significantly from the urban cultures prevailing in the other parts of Asia,
therefore it is better to discuss the "Central Asian" as an entirely separate culture. It must be noted here that not all the nomadic peoples of the
Eurasian steppe region can be considered as part of the Central Asian
culture. The "original" (Neolithic) racial composition of these peoples
was quite varied. There were European nomads in Southern Russia (the
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol54/iss54/5
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name "Russia" is meant here as a geographic term which includes
Eastern Europe and Western Siberia), Middle Eastern (pre-Turkic)
nomads in the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan region, and Asian nomads
probably to the east of the Altai mountains only. But there was a general tendency among these peoples to wander (typically westward) into
the territories of sedentary cultures where (if they were able to conquer
the attacked state) they settled as a new "ruling class." Such settling
down occurred only when the nomad tribes reached a certain level of
social development. Different groups of nomads reached this level of
development at different times: Indo-Europeans earlier, Asians later
(see [4], [5]).
Therefore, when the really great nomadic empires were formed,
the Asian nomads became predominant.
In India the truly Indian great powers usually united (almost) the
whole subcontinent, therefore a geographic subdivision is not necessary. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the vastness of the continent and the ethnic diversity of the population certainly justifies some subdivision, but
no great powers emerged there and the historical data about the significant states (regional powers) of Black Africa is rather unsure, therefore
we may omit the subdivision of Africa, too.
Now it is possible to analyse the individual histories of each civilization. But instead of going into the innumerable details (which
would certainly lead nowhere), we should concentrate on the "most
important" events. Such "most important" events could be the following:
• Events / processes closely related to the existence of the great
powers of the civilization
• Events / processes closely related to the (relative) status of the
great powers of civilization
This list may seem subjective, but the following should be noted:
• This method is consistent with the traditional method of historiography. Conventional "world histories" are practically histories of the great powers, and historians usually comment on the
importance of the various events (and the most decisive "commenting" happens before the writing: firstly they decide what
is important enough to write down).
If we find some repeating patterns / events (without ignoring
many details it would be impossible - history never repeats
itself exactly) then we may extrapolate these patterns into the
future. If the predicted events really occur (we or our descenPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2006
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ly will see it) then it will be a strong indication of the theory's correctness.
3. Long-term processes
3.1 Europe
First we should examine the major "turning points" in the histories
of the civilizations. Once again, the best place to start is European civilization. In traditional historiography, European history is divided into
three major ages: antiquity, medieval, and modern. The Neolithic can be
considered the first age. Neolithic societies also were based on surplusproducing economies, and many important innovations appeared in that
age (bronze and iron working, domestication of animals for traction and
riding, simple methods of long-distance navigation). Also, many
important features of the societies of antiquity appeared in primitive
forms (social stratification, cities, long-distance trade).
It is generally agreed that the medieval period ends with Columbus
(reaching America in 1492) or with Luther (publishing his theses in
1517). The approximate starting date of the modern age is 1500 CE. The
starting date of the medieval period is usually assumed to be 476 CE
(deposition of Romulus Augustulus by Odoacer) but other dates also
can be suggested (Christianity becoming the state religion of the Roman
Empire in 391, partitioning of the Roman Empire into Eastern and
Western Empires in 395, or the final fall of the Ostrogothic kingdom in
553). Therefore the approximate starting date of the Middle Ages can be
500 CE.
Although there is no generally agreed date for the beginning of
Antiquity, it is reasonable to assume that it started with the appearance
of the first major urban cultures in South-eastern Europe, i.e. with the
Minoans or with the Mycenaeans. The origin of the Minoans is
unknown, but it is frequently assumed that they came from the Middle
East. It is also possible that the Minoan culture was the result of the
original Neolithic population's internal development (see [6]).
The origin of the Mycenaeans is much more certain: since their
writing (Linear B) was deciphered by M. Ventris (see [7]) we know that
they were early Greeks (i.e. Indo-Europeans). But the Linear B tablets
contain only routine administrative notes, dated information about their
large-scale activities is purely archaeological. They were quite rich
already in the 16 century BCE (shaft graves used between 1600-1500
BCE) but their palaces were built somewhat later (1450-1350 BCE).
lh
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The date of 1500 BCE seems to be acceptable as an "average starting
date" of the Mycenaean sub-civilization. It is an interesting parallelism
with the Modern Age that even these early European states tended to
colonise. They occupied Crete about 1450 BCE, and their first colonies
on the western coast of Anatolia (Miletus, Colophon, etc.) appeared
approximately in the same time. But it is possible that Minoan trading
posts - or even small colonies - existed on the Anatolian coast before the
arrival of the Mycenaeans.
The earliest Neolithic settlements in South-eastern Europe
appeared about 6500 BCE, but those early farmers probably were not
Europeans but were Middle Eastern migrants from Anatolia. There is a
theory that claims that the whole Neolithic population of Europe
descended from such Middle Eastern migrants (see [8]), but this is a
strong claim which got much criticism. It is more probable that those
migrants appeared only in certain areas of Europe (Balkan peninsula,
large river valleys) whereas most of the Neolithic farmers of Europe
were descendants of the previous Mesolithic population (see [9]).
Another difficult problem is the origin of the Indo-Europeans,
which has great importance because all the "great nations" of Europe
are of Indo-European origin. It is a much debated issue, too (see [4],
[9], [10], [11], [12]). If we accept that the original homeland of the IndoEuropeans was in Southern Russia, then the starting date of the "IndoEuropean Neolithic" is approximately 5500 BCE. In this case we can
make an interesting observation: if the starting dates of the "large historical ages" are listed as 5500 BCE, 1500 BCE, 500 CE, 1500 CE,
then it seems that the durations of the ages are halving. The beginning
of a "new age" can be expected in 2000 CE (certainly not exactly in this
year but very probably before 2050 CE).
It must be noted that the validity of this "halving rule" really does
not depend on the assumption of the "Indo-European primacy." After
all, Indo-Europeans became Europeans only in Europe. When they
migrated to the regions of other civilizations there they integrated into
those other civilizations. We can assume that the Medieval Age began
in 400 CE, which is reasonable because the Western Roman Empire was
in steep decline at that time. Britannia and most of Gaul were lost before
410 and Rome was sacked by the Visigoths in 410. Extrapolate backward, then we get the following dates: beginning of Antiquity about
1800 BCE (the first Minoan palaces were built about 1900 BCE); and
the beginning of the European Neolithic about 6200 BCE (not too far
from the generally accepted 6500 BCE). In this case the starting point
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2006
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of the "new age" is 2050 CE (a more realistic date than the year 2000
CE).
Antiquity and the Modern Age can be paralleled in many ways:
• European states were very active participants of the "world
economy," and mass production and long-distance trading
were typical
• The European great powers made major efforts at colonisation.
In the second half of each age, large colonial empires were created (Roman, British, Russian, and others)
• Near the end of each age, the European great powers became
militarily (and economically) weaker while the "third world"
powers became relatively stronger (the defeats of the "superpowers" in Vietnam and Afghanistan are very ominous signs)
To avoid misunderstandings, the following must be noted: the
"clash of the civilizations" is a popular theory now (see [13]), and it is
possible to describe the end of the Antiquity as such a clash. But such a
description is misleading; the decline of the (Ancient or Modern) great
powers is caused mostly by internal problems and the "barbarian invasions" (which are the consequences of a well advanced decline) deliver the "coup the grace" only to the hopelessly weakened state or empire.
At least from the viewpoint of economy, the Neolithic and the
Medieval Ages also can be paralleled. In both ages, the economic selfsufficiency of small regions was typical and long-distance trade was a
rarity. One may say that the volume of the long-distance trade between
Europe and the other parts of the world was increasing during the
Medieval Age. This is true, but it doesn't negate the abrupt fall between
the Late Antiquity and the Early Medieval Age.
If we compare the tables of large cities in [3], then we can see that
in 361 CE there were four cities in Europe with more than 50,000 inhabitants (their total population was 570,000) But in 622 CE, there was
only one city in Europe with more than 50,000 inhabitants
(Constantinople, with 350,000 inhabitants). This indicates a great
decline because the persons involved in mass production and long-distance trade are usually city-dwellers. Therefore, we may infer that the
coming "new age" of the European civilization will be somewhat similar to the Medieval Age (i.e. it can be named as "New Medieval Age").
This is a surprising prediction: the "globalization of the world" is a
seemingly unstoppable process now, but the discussion above indicates
that the next 250 years will be the age of "localization" (at least in the
areas belonging to the European civilization). The grave problems
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol54/iss54/5
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caused by the current globalization process are clearly visible (see e.g.
[14]) and it is quite possible that those problems will become fatal within some decades.
There is an other argument that is perhaps hypothetical, but also
indicates the necessity of this "New Medieval Age." One of the greatest achievements of the medieval Europeans is the Medieval Technical
Revolution, which provided (among other things) the tools necessary
for world-wide colonisation (ocean-worthy ships, advanced navigational techniques etc.). If there will be another colonising age (from 2300
CE?), then probably the most important targets of colonisation will be
celestial bodies (outer space). It is a common belief that we cannot colonize outer space now because our space transportation technologies
are too expensive.
There is some truth in this, but the real problem occurs when the
astronauts arrive somewhere. They have no logistics to remain long
before their reserves run out. This is a straight consequence of our modern industrial technologies: everything is produced in large quantities,
in large factories containing many highly specialised machines, utilising the best raw materials (no matter if those must be delivered from
thousands of kilometres). In outer space, one cannot have enormous
equipment and the only available raw materials are just "ordinary
stones." A radical change in our industrial technologies will be necessary to produce industrial-quality products in small quantities with relatively small equipment from low quality raw materials. In the modern
globalized world economy such a change is impossible, but in a "localized" world where industrially advanced groups may find themselves
isolated in an adverse environment in a not too large territory, there will
be a strong incentive to develop such technologies (not only for industrial but for agricultural production too).
3.2 Middle East
Historians sometimes use the terms "Antiquity" and "Medieval
Age" for non-European civilizations, too, but there are no generally
agreed upon delimiting dates such as in the European case. The beginning of the Neolithic is well defined: the first farmers/herders, although
in practice, there are few anthropological remnants that could distinguish between cultures.
It is generally agreed that Antiquity begins with the appearance of
relatively large states. In the case of Middle Eastern civilization, the
Neolithic began about 9500 BCE (first herders in northern Iraq, see
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2006
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[15]), but according to R.Unger-Hamilton [16], if the function of some
Epi-Paleolithic tools is interpreted properly, then there was agriculture
in the Middle East before 10,000 BCE.
In Egypt the first large state was the Old Kingdom, which was
formed about 2800 BCE. The unification of Upper and Lower Egypt
happened a bit earlier, but because of the general uncertainties in the
Middle Eastern chronologies (see [17]) it is better to accept this date. In
Mesopotamia the first certainly existing large state was the Akkadian
Empire, created about 2300 BCE. In earlier times, Sumerian city-states
sometimes conquered other cities and created small empires, but the
extent of these empires is very unsure, therefore it is better to consider
the Akkadian empire as the first. As an "average" date for the beginning
of the Antiquity in the Middle East, 2600 BCE seems to be acceptable.
In the history of the Middle East there is only one more event
which is generally accepted as a major turning point: the appearance of
Islam. The "Hegira" happened in 622 CE, but the real force of the new
faith manifested itself during the rule of the "elected Caliphs" (632-661)
and the Omayyads (661-750), when Muslim armies conquered almost
the whole Middle East and some parts of South-Western Europe.
Therefore the "third Middle Eastern age" began approximately in
700 CE. To call it "Medieval Age" would be quite misleading. City life
and long-distance trade flourished under the Islamic Empire, and even
more important, Arabs were the first real Middle Eastern colonisers. All
the previous Middle Eastern empires were rather unifiers than colonisers because they didn't conquer territories outside the Middle East.
There are seeming counter-examples, the most important ones are
the following:
• Phoenicians. They founded colonies in the south-western
Mediterranean (including Sicily and Spain) during the 10 - 6 centuries BCE, in parallel with the Greek colonisation of some northern and central Mediterranean regions. The original inhabitants of
Phoenicia were a Semitic people (Canaanites) but during the invasions of the "Sea Peoples" in the 12 century BCE, the region
changed significantly. On the coast of Palestine (next to Phoenicia)
a large group of the Sea Peoples settled down (the Philistines). It is
very probable that other Sea People groups were received into the
Phoenician cities where they mixed with the original population. It
is almost certain that advanced maritime technologies appeared in
Phoenicia after these invasions. Therefore the Phoenician sub-civilization cannot be considered as a purely Middle Eastern one; it had
th

th
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a significant "European inheritance" too.
• Persians (the Achaemenid empire, 553-330 BCE). They conquered almost the whole Middle East, but they didn't conquer territories outside it and probably didn't want to.
The famous Greco-Persian wars can be interpreted as punitive
actions triggered by a revolt of the Greek cities on the Anatolian coast.
The Indus valley also belonged to the Persian Empire but it is questionable whether that region is really an "ancient homeland" of Indian civilization (see below).
If we accept the above described periodization of the Middle
Eastern history (the third age could be named as the "Age of
Expansion") then the starting dates of the ages are the following: 9500
BCE, 2600 BCE, 700 CE. We can see that the duration of the Antiquity
is roughly half of the Neolithic, therefore, it is probable that we have a
"halving rule" here, too. In this case, the end of the "Age of Expansion"
can be expected about 2350 CE. The prediction which follows from this
is that the history of the Middle East in the next three centuries will be
rather similar to the previous 1300 years: sometimes a large empire is
created, this empire makes some colonisation efforts, and after several
centuries it disintegrates.
3.3 India
The Indian subcontinent can be divided into three large regions: the
Indus valley, the Ganges valley and the southern region. The development of these regions was rather asynchronous, especially in prehistory. Neolithic villages appeared in the Indus valley very early (between
7000-6000 BCE), while in the other regions, the Neolithic began only
after 5000 BCE. The domesticated plants and animals (wheat, sheep
etc.) used by the early farmers in the Indus valley were of Middle
Eastern origin. In the same region appeared the first urban culture of the
subcontinent, the Harappan sub-civilization, which existed approximately from 2500 BCE to 1800 BCE.
Before discovering the early Neolithic villages of the Indus valley,
archaeologists thought that the Harappan (sub-Civilization was created
by migrants from the Middle East. Nowadays this culture is usually
considered as the result of the internal development of the indigenous
Neolithic population, but it is still possible that the previous theory was
correct. In some Neolithic villages of the Indus valley a "destruction
layer" was found which can be dated about 2500 BCE; this could be the
result of an invasion by the founders of the Harappan culture.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2006
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In the ancient history of India there is only one more major turning
point: the creation of the Maurya empire (about 300 BCE) because this
was the first really large state which united almost the whole subcontinent. If we consider the ancient Indus valley as an integral part of the
Indian civilization, we get the following starting dates of the great historical ages: 7000 BCE, 2500 BCE, 300 BCE. Here we can see again a
"halving rule"- the duration of the second age is roughly the half of the
first age. Using this rule we can extrapolate the sequence of the starting
points, the following elements are: 800 CE, 1350 CE to 1900 CE (end
point).
But this is very unconvincing; these dates are not especially significant in the history of India and this history certainly didn't end in 1900.
But there is another possibility: the Indus valley may not belong to the
Indian civilization. If we want to draw a dividing line between the
Middle Eastern and the Indian civilizations in modern times, then we
should choose the India-Pakistan border. This dividing line is not a new
phenomenon: a similar border existed between the Indus valley and the
rest of the subcontinent many times (during the existence of the
Harappan sub-civilization, the Achaemenid Empire, the Kushan
Empire, the Abbasids, the Ghaznevids etc.).
If we ignore the Indus valley, then we have only two significant
dates in Indian history: 5000 BCE (beginning of the Neolithic), and 300
BCE (creation of the Maurya empire). If we suppose that the general
development of the Indian civilization will be similar to the development of the Middle Eastern civilization, then we may expect the beginning of the "Indian Age of Expansion" about 2050 CE. But this date
might be too early. If we assume that the Indo-Europeans ("Aryans")
played the most significant role in the development of the Indian civilization, we must put back the beginning of the Neolithic to 5500 BCE.
In this case, the "Indian Age of Expansion" will begin about 2300 CE.
3.4 East Asia
For East Asian civilization, the most important country belonging
to it is China. In China the Neolithic began about 9500 BCE (see [18]).
The first large Chinese state was the Shang Empire, which was founded about 1500 BCE (the extent - in time and territory - of the previous
Hsia empire is uncertain). In the history of ancient China there are no
more similarly significant dates. Since the end of the Shang empire, disintegration and integration phases follow each other rather unevenly. If
we assume that East Asian civilization follows the long-term develophttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol54/iss54/5
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ment pattern of the Middle Eastern civilization then we may expect the
beginning of the "East Asian Age of Expansion" in 2500 CE. This is a
rather far-off date, but the starting dates used in this calculation are not
very certain and the previous assumption also may prove false. But it is
certain that China was not a colonising power throughout it's history.
Just two examples:
• China never colonised Siberia (in spite of its closeness)
• When the expeditions organised by Cheng Ho (in the first half of
the 15'" century CE) created the possibility of China becoming
the greatest naval and trading power of the Indian Ocean, the
Ming emperors refused this and introduced a strict isolationist
policy
Japan is seemingly a counter-example, at least its very active role
in the 20 century may suggest this. But Japan didn't intend to colonise
territories belonging to European civilization; its clashes with the
European great powers followed after those great powers had colonised
Asian territories (Manchuria, Philippines, Singapore etc.).
3.5 Black Africa
In the case of the Black African civilization, the earliest Neolithic
villages and the earliest states appeared in the Nile valley, not too far
from Egypt. But this is probably a product of the strong influence of the
nearby Middle Eastern civilization centre, not of an indigenous development. It is better to examine West and South Africa.
The earliest neolithic (agricultural) sites in the southern part of
West Africa are dated about 4500 BCE, but pastoralism in the western
Sahara (much more humid in the Neolithic than now) began earlier
(about 6000 BCE, cattle domestication). The earliest states in West and
South Africa (Ghana, Zimbabwe?) appeared about 600 CE. If we
assume that the long-term development of the African civilization follows the pattern of the Middle Eastern civilization, then the starting
dates of the "African Ages" are the following: 6000 BCE, 600 CE, 3900
CE, i.e. an "African Age of Expansion" can be expected only in the far
future.
lh

3.6 Central Asia
For Central Asian nomad civilization, the Neolithic began with the
domestication of the horse. This happened about 5500 BCE in the
southern steppe of Eastern Europe, but it reached Mongolia at a much
later time, probably about 3000 BCE. As we have already seen, Asian
nomads were the most important constituents of this civilization (at
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least in historical times). The existence of the first large Hsiung-nu state
(tribal alliance?) was noted by Chinese chroniclers about 200 BCE.
The aggressiveness of these early nomad states didn't mean that
they were colonisers: they just wanted to collect tribute or sometimes
wanted to enforce the continuation of an advantageous trade. If a sedentary state met them with force, then they tried to crush it but when they
succeeded, they didn't take over the administration of the area (see [5]).
This method was changed only when Genghis Khan created his
great empire (about 1200 CE) with a sedentary capital (Karakorum) and
with an administrative organisation. From this point, the Mongols were
able to take over the government of sedentary states (or create their own
sedentary states) but in this way they lost their nomadic advantages and
sooner or later their dynasties (or even their states) disappeared.
Their starting dates are the following: 3000 BCE, 200 BCE, 1200
CE. In spite of the significant differences between the Middle Eastern
and the Central Asian civilizations, the names used in the case of the
Middle Eastern civilization (Neolithic, Antiquity, "Age of Expansion")
fit well in this case. The extrapolation of this sequence yields 1900 CE
as the next significant date.
The Central Asian nomads did nothing important at that time (they
were too few and too weak already), and experienced their last age —
the "Age of Final Decline" which will lead to their disappearance. The
parallelism of the Middle Eastern and the Central Asian civilizations
might suggest that the next great "Middle Eastern Age" will be an "Age
of Final Decline" too. But it is not certain; the differences are plentiful.
The next great "Middle Eastern Age" might be quite different (e.g.
one may imagine a true "Middle Eastern Medieval Age").
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3.7 Summary
The great historical ages of the major civilizations are summarised in
Table 1.
Table 1
CSvilization l*t«6«
2nd age
3idage
4th age
Medium Age, Modem Age,
Antiquity,
Eutape an
Neolithic,
from 5500 BCEfiom 1500 BCE fiom 500 CE fiom 1500 CE
(fiom [5200 (fiom 1H00 (fiom 400 CE?)
BCE?)
BCE'')
Middle Eastern Neolithic,
Antiquity,
Age of
fiom
from 9 500 BCEfiom 2 >500 BCE Expansion
700 CE
Indian
Neolithic,
Antiquity,
torn 5000 BCEfiom 300 BCE
East Asian Neolithic,
Antiquity,
Cram 9 500 BCE fiom 1500 BCE
Black. African Neolithic,
Antiquity,
(torn <5000 BCE fiom dOO CE
Age of
Central Asian Neolithic,
Age of Final
Antiquity,
Expansion,
fiom
(nomad)
Decline,
from 3000 BCE fiom 200 BCE 1200 CE
fiom 1900 CE
4. Medium-term processes
Here again, better to begin with European civilization, because it
can be more apparent what is the event that will initiate the "New
Medieval Age" predicted in the previous section. It is a well known
feature of Europe's Modern Age history that there is roughly a hundred-year cycle of "world wars" (great power wars involving the
majority of the European great powers). This was known already in
the 19th century (see 1), but there was no general agreement about
which were "world wars." This cycle was (seemingly) not connected
with other historical phenomena, therefore it was considered as a
hypothesis only. The theory was obviously successful (WWI came
exactly as one could expect and from hindsight we know that "WWII
was only a continuation of WWI"). In the last two decades, this theory
has been explored:
• The data necessary to describe every war in comparable terms
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was identified (severity, extent etc.) and collected about each
war of the European Modern Age (see [19]).
The data about the strengths of the great navies was collected
(see [20], [21]) and it was recognised that the relative capability of these navies shows a concentration/deconcentration pattern (sometimes one great power owns more than 50% of the
total naval capability of the great powers).
It was shown that throughout the whole Modern Age, there are
long economic cycles (the Kondratieff cycles, named after N.
Kondratieff, who first identified such cycles but only in a
shorter historical interval) with a roughly 50 years period, each
period consisting of an "upswing" and a "downswing" phase.
It was shown that the severity of the "great power wars" (number of battle fatalities in a given interval) strongly correlates
with these economic cycles (see [22]).
Table 2 Source* [19] - war severity data, war classification.
[22] - Kondratieff cycle timing.
[21] - significant naval power concentration timing
total i r u seventy
total war seventy of total war time intervals of the
(thousand* ofbattle
greatpowerwars in severityof signifrcant naval [lower
Heath*) af gieat pawe i
the "upswing" (U)
great
concentiation* (moil than
itrui m 50 yeaw intervals and "downswing" power war* 50% share of one countryof
end the nunit>ei afsuch (D) phases of
in the
the total gieat power naval
c u t (in which at leant one Kondi ah eff cycles complete eapetiilitie*)
yea t power fought on
Kondiahefl
each tide) in these
cycles
intervals
1501-1550:391
1502-1544 (Portugal)
1509-1528 (0) 1(51 221
no. of great power wars 1529-153S(D) SO
13
1539-1558 (0) : 277 <B7
1551 -1(500: 431
1594-1597 flpail«
30 af great power wars 1559-1574(D) 1 ®
13
1(501-1(550:2092
1575-1594(0) 112 223
16CB-1642 (the Netheiland*,
intermittent!
no a f g n a t power urais 6 1595-1620 (D) 111
1(521-1649 (0) 2071 2739
1(551-1700 1732
no. of great pawei wais 1650-16B8 (D) « B
11
1701-1750: 1302
1(5E9-1719(0) 2404 2865
1719-1723 (Great Bntam)
no af g l u t pa wet wais (5 1720-1746 (D) 452
1747-17(51 (0) 992 1026
1751-1800 16B9
no of great power wais: 3 17(52-1789 (D) 34
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These results are summarised in Table 2.
In spite of all these results, the most basic question as to a recognizable cycle of great European wars with the period of 100 years is still
unanswered. Some authors think that the cycle of the "world wars" has
the period of 150 years. They argue (see [22]) that the three highest
peaks in war severity data (in [19]) occur at the Thirty Years War (161848), at the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) and at WWII (1939-45). This
agrees with the traditional historical narratives, that these wars (and the
concluding peace agreements) are usually considered as major turning
points of European history.
Others argue that the history of the Modern Age should be considered as a succession of "hegemonic powers," see [23]. These hegemonic powers are those states which obtain a more than 50% share of the
total naval capability (see [20] and Table 2). It is usually assumed that
these naval capability concentrations are the results of great power
wars, i.e. the most important great power wars are those which precede
the occurrence of these concentrations (see [21]). This is a rather problematic argumentation; e.g., according to this concept, the Thirty Years
War was not an important war. In recent studies (see [24]) it was shown
that these hegemons are primarily "trading hegemons," not "military
hegemons."
According to this new concept, in the downswing phase of every
Kondratieff cycle, certain innovations (organisational, commercial, and
technical) appear. The future hegemon pioneers the utilisation of these
innovations and obtains a large share in world trade during the next
upswing phase. This extensive trade makes it possible and worthwhile
to create a large merchant fleet and to protect this fleet with a large
navy. This causal chain agrees well with the historical narratives. It is
also characteristic that the "hegemons" are not the main participants of
the great wars, but as "fortuitous outsiders," they can increase their
wealth enormously during the wars by selling war materials. Their economic advantages are increased but not created by the great wars.
This "hegemonic" description resembles somewhat that description of Antiquity in which the history of the Mediterranean is discussed
as a succession of thalassocracies (Minoans, Mycenaeans, Phoenicians,
Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Byzantines). This is a much criticised
concept (see [25]) but in spite of these criticisms, it has been popular
since Antiquity. It is an interesting analogy that the first thalassocracies
/ hegemons (such as Minoans or the Portuguese) are rather small and
weak (a typical counter-argument in the mentioned criticisms), but their
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2006

17

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 54 [2006], No. 54, Art. 5

Csaba Kecsces

45

successors are gradually stronger and at the end, real "superpowers"
(Roman Empire, British Empire) appear.
The author thinks that the best way to explain the war severity data
distribution listed in Table 2 is to assume the existence of two factors.
The first is economic (as discussed in [22]) and increases the severity of
the great power wars in the upswing phases of the Kondratieff cycles.
The second factor is not yet identified, but it is well synchronised with
the calendar centuries. It increases the severities of great- power wars in
the first half of every century and decreases the severities in the second
halves of the centuries. The intensity of this "second factor" is gradually increasing; it was quite ineffective in the 16 century but very effective in the 20 century (see Table 2). This "second factor" might be connected to the "hegemonic cycle" but the causal link is not obvious.
Using this model, one may expect the outbreak of the next "world
war" of European history near the end of the next Kondratieff upswing
phase, approximately between 2015 and 2025. Right now this looks like
an improbable prediction because today there is only one superpower,
and any attack against it seems to be hopeless. But we must take into
consideration the following:
• A sudden collapse of the USA (similar to the collapse of the
Soviet Union) is improbable, but its relative strength is gradually declining
• Two previous world wars were preceded by the "sudden rise" of
the attacking great power (France from 1792 to 1802 and
Germany from 1930 to 1940)
As it was mentioned, there is no generally agreed answer to the
question "which were the most important great power wars of the
Modern Age?" But most authors agree that the last three "world wars"
were the followings:
• War of the Spanish Succession and the (second) Great Northern
War (1701-14, 1700-21)
• Napoleonic Wars (1803-15)
• WWI and WWII (1914-18, 1939-45)
The Great Northern War is sometimes ignored, but in fact it was an
"auxiliary war" of the Spanish Succession (somewhat similarly to the
WWII when the "German" and "Japanese" wars went on rather independently). After the peace of Utrecht, some belligerents (Prussia,
Denmark etc.) of the latter war joined the former one to increase their
territorial gains. There was a common feature of these "world wars:" a
large invading army entered Russia and after a long forward push, it
th

lh
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was crushed by the Russians. These catastrophes were decisive events,
therefore we may expect that Russia will be an important participant of
the next world war, too. It indicates that in the beginning of the 21 century the "suddenly rising great power" will be Russia. This is again a
surprising prediction but the followings also show that it is a probable
development:
• Such a sudden rise is not unprecedented in Russian history
(compare the status of the Soviet Union in 1922 and in 1945)
• Russia still has many key features necessary for a superpower
(large territory, large population, large industrial base with hightech capabilities, etc.). The Russian GDP fell significantly when
the Soviet Union collapsed, but it is increasing since 1997
although unevenly. The active participation of Russia in the international space program shows that the key parts of its high-tech
industries are functioning well.
• Russia still owns and maintains the nuclear arsenal inherited
from the Soviet times; the build-up of a comparable arsenal by
any other great power in the next 20 years is very improbable
The great military successes in the previous world wars probably
created the impression in many Russian strategists that they are invincible in a defensive war. This is not necessarily true, because in earlier
times, there was at least one important counter-example: the successes
of the Mongol armies. If a modern military genius could combine the
firepower and short-distance speed of modern armies with the mobility
and self-sufficiency of nomad armies, then he could win, even against
Russia. But such a development is very improbable in the near future;
therefore, Russian leaders might be too easily tempted into a war. They
might not win it, but certainly would not suffer an annihilating defeat.
The real danger comes not from this, but from the opposite possibility.
If an advancing Russian army reaches the borders of a "nuclear power"
(this might be even Pakistan), then that power might decide to use its
nuclear weapons. From this point, the war might escalate very quickly
into a total nuclear exchange, involving all the "nuclear powers" and
their allies, too.
Because the occurrence of the next world war in the predicted interval would be a great success of social theory, it would also be the greatest catastrophe for mankind, and we must try to prevent it. Typical suggestions (see [24], [26]) for prevention would be to increase the importance and power (including military power) of various international
organisations, especially the UN. This should lead to the formation of a
st
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"world state" that controls most nuclear weapons (i.e. has its own army)
and which is governed democratically by some top-level council of the
UN (probably not the present Security Council, which is frequently
paralysed by vetoes).
Unfortunately the formation of such a world state in the near future
is certainly impossible. The modern nation-state (with "sovereignty"
among its most cherished values) will not subjugate its military forces
(especially if they have nuclear weapons) to any international organisation. But there is another possibility: from the analysis of the long-term
processes of European history, we know that the "New Medieval Age"
will start soon and the various European states/regions will be rather
isolated and self-sufficient in that age. If the great powers could deliberately create such a "localized" world, then there wouldn't be a next
world war. "Localization" principles are well known in international
politics, like the famous "Pancha Shila" (mutual respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty, no intervention in the internal affairs of other
states etc.).
Such actions would be quite consistent with a certain type of great
power politics: isolationism has a long tradition in many countries. The
current "interventionist" politics of the USA and some European great
powers is very unfortunate, especially in regions near Russia. Creating
new military bases near the Russian borders are aggressive moves even
if it is done in the name of "peace."
In the case of non-European civilizations, there is no such commonly known "historical pattern" like the periodical world wars of the
European history, but there is one common feature in every great civilization: the rise and fall of empires. According to A. Toynbee, before
the final decline of any civilization, a "universal empire" is created
which lasts for approximately 400 years. According to the concept presented here, the "final decline" of most civilizations will happen only in
the far future (if it will happen at all), but it is quite possible that the
"typical" lifetimes of great empires fall into the 300-500 year intervals.
Further analysis within the limits of this article is not possible, but one
may find relevant informations about the spatial and temporal extent of
the great empires in [27], [28], [29], [30].
5. Short-term processes
Here again, the best choice is to begin with European civilization.
The most salient repetitive events of European history in the second half
of the 20 century are the crises of the East-central European countries:
th
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1956: violent revolt and Soviet intervention in Hungary
1968: non-violent revolt and Warsaw Pact intervention
in Czechoslovakia
•
1981: non-violent revolt and coup d'etat in Poland
•
1991-95: civil/secession war in Yugoslavia.
One may think that these crises were only the manifestations of the
"general crisis of communism," but this interpretation is wrong. The
most serious event (the Yugoslavian war) occurred after the fall of
European communism and Yugoslavia was the "least communist" and
most independent among the East-central European countries. If we try
to extrapolate backward from the above sequence, we get the following
dates: 1944, 1932, 1920, 1908. In fact, there were serious crises in the
region at these dates (or near to these): 1944 - Warsaw uprising, 1934 coup d'etats in Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia, 1919 - RomanianHungarian war.
The Balkan wars (1912-13) were somewhat "out of phase," but this
points to the real cause of the crises: the East-central European region
(in its modern form) was created after the WWI rather unnaturally (ethnic boundaries were not respected). The region has been plagued with
ethnic problems since then. Naturally these problems manifest themselves regularly in the form of violent crises. We may expect another
crisis in the 2001-5 interval. The exact nature of this coming crisis is not
yet obvious. Right now it would be easy to point to Kosovo and to predict an Albanian-Serbian war, but easy solutions are not always the right
solutions. For example, in an early description of this theory, the author
predicted that the crisis in the early 1990s would occur in Romania (see
[31]). This was not a bad guess (the fall of the Romanian dictatorship at
the end of 1989 was a violent event), but now we know that the real crisis of the decade was the Yugoslavian war.
The severity of an ethnic crisis is probably proportional with the
size of the ethnic minority involved. There is a large (almost two million) Hungarian minority in Romania, and the outbreak of a grave conflict is probable, although not necessarily in the near future. If Kosovo
will secede from Serbia, then the Hungarians will be the last significant
minority there, and this also may cause a conflict. The largest ethnic
minority in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union is Russian.
Their presence in Belarus and in the Ukraine is not very disturbing
(these peoples are culturally similar to the Russians), but in the Baltic
states, they are frequently treated as undesirable aliens. A crisis involvPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2006
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ing a Russian minority group (if it occurs in the right time, i.e. between
2015 and 2025) could provide the perfect ignition mechanism for the
next world war unless the other great powers will respect the limits of
the "Russian sphere of influence". There are no such generally agreed
limits today.
It must be noted here that in the earlier centuries of the Modern
Age, east-central Europe was rather an "average" region, whereas the
really dangerous conflict zones were the divided countries of Western
and Southern Europe (the Netherlands, Germany, Italy). If the great
powers could agree on the limits of their "spheres of influence" in the
region (as in the 19th century), then the "dangerousness" of East-central
Europe would decrease significantly.
In political science, the conflict zones similar to East-central
Europe are described as "shatterbelts" (see [32], [33]). According to
[33] in the second half of the 20 century the shatterbelts are the following: Middle East, East Asia, South-east Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, Middle America (i.e. Central America and the Caribbean
islands). East-central Europe is not considered a shatterbelt because the
Russian occupation of the region putatively stabilised it. As we have
seen, even this occupation didn't eliminate the conflicts, it only dampened them. Now that the region is "free" again, we have good reasons
to consider it a shatterbelt (there is serious internal instability and great
power rivalry in it). The previous list contains only the "great shatterbelts;" there are some zones which could be described as "small shatterbelts" (e.g. Northern Ireland), but because of their relative unimportance, these are ignored. The above list is over-generalising, too,
because in most cases, the mentioned (sometimes very big) geographic
regions are not the shatterbelts, whereas some smaller subregions are.
Such subregions can be identified by various methods, but a detailed
analysis would exceed the limits of this article.
One may ask whether there are such periodical crisis sequences in
the other shatterbelts as in the east-central European one. The answer is
not easy; the crises are so numerous in these regions that almost arbitrary "crisis series" can be created. But the following examples (in
which the elements of the series are somewhat similar events) probably
indicate that such cycles exist:
• Arab-Israeli wars: 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 1991 (in the
latter war, Israel participated only passively, but this happened
only because of the very active presence of the USA)
• Chad: 1965-67 (anti-government revolts), 1971 (strikes, governth
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ment crisis), 1975 (coup d'etat), 1980-81 (civil war, Libyan intervention), 1986 (civil war, driving out the Libyans), 1990 (coup
d'etat)
• Vietnam: 1945 (beginning of the anti-colonial revolution), 195455 (battle of Dien Bien Phu, independence of Vietnam, secession
of South Vietnam), 1964-65 (US bombing of North Vietnam
began, US expedition force arrived to South Vietnam), 1975 (victory of the communist forces, unification of Vietnam)
• Central America: 1948-51 (civil war in Costa Rica, revolution in
Panama), 1959-62 (revolution in Cuba, US-supported counterrevolutionary attacks, civil war in Dominica), 1969 ("soccer war"
of Honduras and Salvador), 1978-80 (revolution in Nicaragua,
civil war in Salvador), 1988-91 (coup d'etats in Haiti, US intervention in Panama)
The above lists only indicate the probability of the hypothesis of
"periodical crises" but certainly don't prove it. But if the predicted crisis in the 2004-8 interval will occur in East-central Europe, then at least
in this region the hypothesis can be considered as proven.
Note: an unabridged version of this article is available on the Internet at
www.geocities.com/csaba56/expolhis.html.
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